Thanks for your response to my piece: the questions you raise are interesting ones. I would say it’s broadly right that, on the whole, ‘analytic philosophy’ (or the confluence of different movements and projects that came to be gathered under that heading from the 1950s onwards) has avoided social and political questions. This goes together with a characteristic ahistoricism (the idea that what are being pursued are ‘perennial’ or ‘eternal’ questions) and, much of the time, with the notion of being merely the handmaiden of ‘exact’ sciences (mathematics and the natural sciences, principally). I’m intrigued that you studied figures such as Quine and Nagel—in the 1960s, by the sounds of it? As I understand things, it was in the 1970s that a revival of interest in political questions got going from within analytic philosophy (kickstarted by the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971)—I’d be intrigued to learn which political philosophers you were studying, and whether they were considered part of an analytic philosophy education. The point about examples is well taken; I’d have liked to provide some, but this is difficult since analytic philosophy has generally not engaged with ‘continental’ philosophers, but merely dismissed them as excessively vague or overly ambitious. (There has often been comparable impatience in the other direction.) So it would require quite a bit of reconstruction to exhibit the disagreement; I suspect this would take us to deep-lying fundamental divergences going back to ways in which e.g. Kant departed from Hume (or Hegel from Kant).